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Attributing minds to vampires in Richard Matheson’s I Am Legend 
Louise Nuttall, University of Nottingham, UK 
 
Abstract 
For Palmer (2004, 2010), and other proponents of a cognitive narratology, research into real-world minds 
in the cognitive sciences provides insights into readers’ experiences of fictional minds. In this article, I 
explore the application of such research to the minds constructed for the vampire characters in Richard 
Matheson’s (1954) science fiction/horror novel I Am Legend.  I draw upon empirical research into ‘mind 
attribution’ in social psychology, and apply Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 2008), and its notion of 
‘construal’, as a framework for the application of such findings to narrative. In my analysis, I suggest that 
readers’ attribution of mental-states to the vampires in Matheson’s novel is strategically limited through a 
number of choices in their linguistic construal. Drawing on online reader responses to the novel, I argue 
that readers’ understanding of these other minds plays an important role in their empathetic experience 
and their ethical judgement of the novel’s main character and focaliser, Robert Neville. Finally, I suggest 
that the limited mind attribution for the vampires invited through their construal contributes to the 
presentation of a ‘mind style’ (Fowler, 1977) for this character.  
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1 Introduction  
In cognitive approaches to literature our processing of fictional minds and real-world 
minds are said to share fundamental similarities (Herman, 2003, 2009, 2013; Palmer, 
2004, 2010; Zunshine, 2006). While fiction might be set apart from real-life in allowing 
readers privileged, intimate access to ‘transparent minds’ through forms of 
consciousness representation (Cohn, 1978), much of our experience of fictional minds – 
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as for real minds – comes from simply observing them in action. For example, despite 
the absence of any linguistic representation of thoughts or perceptions for the characters 
in the sentence The girl chased the cat into the road and the driver skidded to a 
screeching halt, we can still infer mental-states for each of them (e.g. innocent 
unawareness for the girl and shock for the driver). Not only are we able to construct 
these minds, but this construction is crucial to our understanding of the causality of the 
events portrayed, and their contribution to a plot. For Palmer (2004), this observation 
presents a challenge for analysts of literature: ‘We need to look more closely at the sets 
of instructions that relate to mental functioning in fictional texts’ (2004: 12). Previous 
approaches in narratology, he argues, including those dealing with focalisation, 
characterisation and (in)direct representations of thought, fail to add up to a ‘coherent 
and complete account’ of fictional minds (2004: 12). Palmer proposes that we broaden 
our study of fictional minds by taking into account cognitive scientific research into 
aspects of real-world minds that are ‘outer, active, public, social, behavioral, evident, 
embodied, and engaged’, or what he refers to collectively as social minds (2010: 39).  
In this article, I explore the application of such a broadened understanding of 
fictional minds, and its significance for readers’ experiences of Richard Matheson’s 
(1954) science fiction/horror novel I Am Legend.  My analysis of this text, and the ‘sets 
of instructions’ through which it manipulates the minds constructed for its characters, 
draws upon research into our everyday attribution of real-world minds in social 
psychology, the stylistic application of which to narrative is supported using the 
framework of ‘construal’ in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008). 
Through this analysis, I suggest that readers’ attributions of mental-states to the vampire 
characters in I Am Legend are strategically limited through a number of choices in their 
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linguistic construal, and that this manipulation of mind attribution contributes 
significantly to a readerly empathetic experience of the novel’s main character and 
focaliser, Robert Neville, and the impact of the dramatic plot twist found at its 
conclusion. Furthermore, I suggest that, when attributed to the focalised perspective of 
Neville, the limited engagement with other minds invited at key points in the narrative 
contributes to the impression of a ‘mind style’ for this character (Fowler, 1977). 
Before presenting my analysis of several extracts from I Am Legend, in the 
following three sections I firstly introduce the novel and the characters under 
consideration, the empirical work in social psychology which provides the background 
for my analysis, and the cognitive grammatical framework through which it will be 
applied.  
 
2 I Am Legend 
Richard Matheson’s (2001[1954]) novel I Am Legend portrays a world in which 
a mysterious virus has transformed the population into murderous vampires. The story 
has seen numerous film adaptations, including The Omega Man (1971) and I Am 
Legend (2007), and is often regarded as a significant milestone in horror and Gothic 
fiction (Oakes, 2000; Clasen, 2010: 313).  
Robert Neville, the novel’s main protagonist, is ‘the last man on Earth’ 
(Matheson, 2001: 94), and engaged in a constant struggle for survival: trapped and 
preyed upon by hordes of vampires in his barricaded Los Angeles home by night, 
hunting and killing dormant vampires by day. While battling with depression and 
alcoholism, Neville attempts to uncover the scientific cause of the pandemic, carrying 
out experiments on infected individuals which lead to an increasing understanding of 
 4 
the various ‘living’ and ‘dead’ varieties, and more efficient ways of destroying them. 
After three years, Neville meets an apparently uninfected woman, Ruth, who ultimately 
reveals her true identity as a vampire and spy, sent to observe him. In the final 30 pages 
of the novel, during which Neville is captured and imprisoned, Ruth explains that the 
vampires have developed medication to allow them to live with their disease and have 
begun to build a new society. For the members of this society, Neville is a killer who 
comes by day to destroy their loved ones; a source of terror and superstition. The novel 
closes with Neville’s transformed understanding of the vampires’ thoughts and feelings 
as he looks out of his cell window and faces his execution.  
 Readers often report an empathetic relationship with this main character, whose 
loss of his wife and daughter to the virus is portrayed in a flashback part-way though the 
novel. For Robert Bloch, ‘Matheson’s skill at creating empathy lends special strength to 
his work’ (cited in Wiater, 1998: 12), while Clasen (2010) attributes its psychological 
realism and resulting empathy to the ‘intuitive understanding of human nature’ which 
Matheson invokes in his readers (315). Supporting such analysis, the most frequent 
reader response in online reviews of the novel on Goodreads (2014) concerns the 
impact of this empathetic experience:  
 
The novel had me so tense in places that I was almost screaming out at the pages 
of the book. I felt the main characters pain, solitude and deep sadness at the loss 
of his love, life and the horrific existence he now endured. (‘Patricia Smith’, 
Goodreads, 2014) 
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More broadly, readers report a feeling of ‘suspense’ and ‘horror’ alongside this 
character during their reading of the text, and ‘surprise’ at the new perspective revealed 
in its ending (Goodreads, 2014). Significantly, this character appears to invite empathy 
even as aspects of his personality are observed that are unlikeable. Readers often 
describe strong negative feelings towards this character, his angry outbursts and 
apparently sexist attitudes in particular, which render the empathetic experience invited 
by Matheson an uncomfortable one. ‘Patricia Smith’ (2014) goes on to comment: 
‘Despite that I found it hard to like him. Maybe I wasn't suppose to like him’ (sic.), 
while another reader observes that: 
 
from what I can tell, its peoples' views on the Neville character that polarize the 
reviews so much. People who love the book like being in Neville's head. People 
who hate it can't stand being in Neville's head. I fell into the latter category. 
(‘Grace S’, Goodreads, 2014) 
 
Such empathy for Robert Neville can be related to the internal focalisation of this 
character in the 3rd person throughout the narrative, and the representation of his beliefs, 
perceptions and emotions through direct, indirect and free indirect thought. Forms of 
access to the inner life of a character have long been regarded in narratology as a 
significant device for the facilitation of empathy (e.g. see van Peer and Pander Maat, 
2001: 230; Keen, 2006: 219-220). Booth (1987: 278), for example, argued that ‘inside 
views can build sympathy even for the most vicious character’. For Leech and Short 
(2007: 277) forms such as free indirect thought and direct thought, in particular, 
represent a departure from the ‘norm’ for thought representation (indirect thought) 
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which invites a sense of increased vividness in our access to the mind of a character and 
a movement towards empathetic alignment. In the opening chapter of the novel, these 
forms of consciousness representation soon reveal the characteristic frustration and 
sarcasm with which Neville confronts his daily existence: ‘After violent attacks, the 
planks were often split or partially pried off, and he had to replace them completely; a 
job he hated. Today only one plank was loose. Isn’t that amazing? he thought’ 
(Matheson, 2001: 7). 
               Forms of consciousness representation might be further analysed in terms of 
their contribution to readers’ complex empathetic experience of this character. Also 
significant, however, and my focus in this article, are the fictional minds constructed for 
the other characters in this fictional world: the vampires responsible for these attacks. 
Though focalised externally through Neville, following Palmer’s (2004) approach, the 
presentation of these characters’ behaviour can be seen to initiate mind construction in 
readers. In the following section I introduce research in social psychology through 
which the attribution of minds to these characters, and its consequences for readers’ 
experiences of the fictional world, might be understood in greater detail.  
 
3 Real minds 
Since the seminal psychological study by Heider and Simmel (1944), our ability to 
attribute mental-states to behaviour has been recognised as an important means through 
which we impose structure on experience, without which the interactions between 
entities around us, and by extension those in fiction, would appear random and 
incomprehensible. The mechanisms underlying this attribution of mind, however, are 
far from agreed upon in the cognitive sciences. In one influential account, a process of 
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‘mindreading’ or ‘mentalizing’ is underpinned by an innate, specialised ability known 
as ‘Theory of Mind’, reliant on folk psychological knowledge or a simulative capacity 
(e.g. Malle and Hodges, 2005).  Recently, the existence of this inferential capacity has 
been questioned, with more basic enacted or socio-cultural mechanisms proposed, and 
the term ‘Theory of Mind’ discouraged in favour of broader terms such as 
‘intersubjectivity’ (Zlatev et al., 2008). Carrying such ongoing debates with it, the 
application of this concept to literature faces a number of potential problems (as 
discussed by Belmonte, 2008; Stockwell, 2009: 140; Palmer, 2011: 209). 
A more immediately productive area of research for the investigation of fictional 
minds, I propose, is that concerned with the factors affecting this process, or the 
cognitive phenomenon that is here generally termed ‘mind attribution’. Categories of 
entities differ in terms of the type of mind that we typically attribute to them: human 
beings are usually perceived as having more complex mental lives than animals or 
robots. However, as research in social psychology shows, our attribution of mind is 
highly variable and somewhat subjective. To some extent, ‘mind is in the eye of the 
perceiver’ (Waytz et al., 2010: 384). Moreover, mind attribution is not a binary 
situation, but a continuum with varying degrees of richness and complexity (Haslam et 
al., 2005; Morewedge et al., 2007). Studies have shown that participants’ positioning of 
an entity along this continuum (usually measured by ratings of mental-states such as 
‘feels pain’, ‘possesses beliefs’ etc. along a point scale) is influenced by a range of 
factors. As my analysis will demonstrate, many of these factors, including the 
perceptual features of the entity in question, and the knowledge, motivations and 
attentional dispositions of the perceiver, are directly applicable to our conceptual 
experiences of fictional characters.  
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Social psychology also offers insights for the consequences of mind attribution. 
Neuroscientific research suggests that our attribution of mental-states is closely related 
to our experience of empathy (Hooker et al., 2008). In Hodges and Wegner’s (1997) 
model, empathy is a state of mind that may be automatically stimulated by mental-state 
‘cues’ in our environment. Significantly, these cues may be perceptual (e.g. seeing 
someone crying), or conceptual – located in our knowledge and experiences (e.g. a 
personal memory of pain). Following this view, it is a desire to avoid a vicarious 
sharing of thoughts and feelings that causes me to look away from a murder scene in a 
horror film (or put down a horror novel) – to divert attention away from the cues for 
mind attribution and opportunity for empathy with the suffering it presents.  
 The richness of the mental-states we attribute also has important consequences 
for our ethical judgements (Gray et al., 2007). In everyday life, many sensitive ethical 
debates about the rights and responsibilities of individuals in society centre on matters 
of mind attribution. For example, positions on animal rights and abortion often hinge on 
the degree to which the animal or foetus is attributed some kind of consciousness. 
Through empirical study, researchers in social psychology have shown that our 
attribution of mental-states is bound-up with our basic appreciation of ethics (Gray et 
al., 2012).  
 
4 Mind construal 
In fiction, a significant source of cues for the attribution of mental-states, according to 
Palmer (2004), is the observation of characters in action. Language offers writers a 
range of choices for the description of actions, varying in the extent to which the 
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motives and feelings which underlie them are made prominent within the reader’s 
attention: 
 
In the case of a death by shooting, do you define the action of the killer as the 
twitching of the finger, the pulling of the trigger, the firing of the gun, the killing 
of a person or the murdering of a person? These descriptions differ to the extent 
to which they ascribe consciousness to the agent, take account of the 
consequences of the physical movement, and assign responsibility to the agent 
for those consequences. (Palmer, 2004: 119) 
 
Applying Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008), such descriptions reflect 
our capacity for construal, or ‘our manifest ability to conceive and portray the same 
situation in alternate ways’ (Langacker, 2008: 43). In Cognitive Grammar, our linguistic 
portrayal of a situation is said to draw upon the same mechanisms involved in our wider 
embodied cognition, including attentional processing in visual perception. ‘In viewing a 
scene,’ Langacker observes, ‘what we actually see depends on how closely we examine 
it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, and where we 
view it from’ (2008: 55). These choices, termed specificity, focusing, prominence and 
perspective respectively, are ‘applicable to conceptions in any domain’, including the 
conceptualisations formed by producers and receivers of language. This model of 
construal has been shown to be particularly applicable to our mental representations of 
literary texts (Stockwell, 2009; Herman, 2009; Harrison et al., 2014).  
               One important way in which construals differ, I propose, is in the degree of 
mind attribution prompted in readers. In Palmer’s ‘shooting’ examples, these construals 
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differ in terms of the portion of the action which readers are invited to attend to – or 
their variable profiling of an action chain for this event (Langacker, 2008: 356). In other 
words, the linguistic construal of an action constitutes a ‘set of instructions’ (Palmer, 
2004) for readers’ ascriptions of a fictional mind as part of their conceptualisation of a 
scene (cf. Langacker’s (2008: 460) description of construals as discursive 
‘instructions’).  
             It has been argued that cognitive developments in literary study are in danger of 
neglecting the textual focus at the heart of stylistics (Gavins and Stockwell, 2012). 
Rundquist (2014: 161), for example, views the discussion of fictional minds in terms of 
real minds as ‘deprioritizing the mechanics and effects of linguistic variations in their 
textual construction’. Extending the dialogue with the cognitive sciences in a linguistic 
direction offers one means of addressing such concerns. By presenting a direct link 
between linguistic choices and our embodied attentional processing of our real-world 
environment, the dimensions of ‘construal’ modelled in Cognitive Grammar offer a 
structured framework for application of the factors affecting mind attribution in social 
psychology to the linguistic construction of fictional minds.  
              In the following section I explore the application of such research to readers’ 
attribution of minds to the vampires in I Am Legend, and its consequences for their 
experience of its main character. 
 
5 Attributing minds to vampires 
5.1 Limited mind attribution and empathy 
              A basic factor affecting our psychological judgements of other entities 
observed in social psychology is the presence of anthropomorphic features, i.e. the 
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extent to which the entity looks or acts like a human and more specifically, our human-
prototype, ourselves. In particular, certain kinds of ‘self-propelled’ motion and ‘goal-
directed’ action seem to act as strong cues for the attribution of rich mental-states 
(Premack and Premack, 1997; Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Morewedge et al., 2007). In 
the opening chapter of I Am Legend, Matheson’s description of the vampires’ behaviour 
and appearance backgrounds or reduces attention to these mental-state cues within the 
conceptualisation invited in the reader. 
           One way in which readers’ attention to these cues is reduced in this opening 
chapter is through what Langacker terms ‘subjective construal’ (2008: 77). In the 
subjective construal seen in extracts (1) and (2), our attention to the ‘object of 
conception’ (the vampires outside Neville’s house) is distracted by the prominent ‘on 
stage’ presence of the ‘subject’ of this conception (Neville, who sits indoors trying to 
ignore them): 
 
(1) 
From the speaker over the hallway door, the music of Schönberg was playing 
loudly.  
      Not loudly enough, though. He still heard them outside, their murmuring and 
their walkings about and their cries, their snarling and fighting among 
themselves. Once in a while a rock or brick thudded off the house. Sometimes a 
dog barked.  
      And they were all there for the same thing. (Matheson, 2001: 12) 
(2) 
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[T]he silence didn’t really help. He could still see them out there, the white-
faced men prowling around his house, looking ceaselessly for a way to get in at 
him. Some of them, probably, crouching on their haunches like dogs, eyes 
glittering at the house, teeth slowly grating together; back and forth, back and 
forth. (Matheson, 2001: 16) 
 
The description of the vampires in both passages can be described as instances of 
‘summary’ writing and ‘iterative frequency’ (Genette, 1988), in which story events 
inferred as taking place over an extended period of time are compressed into a single 
impression in the thoughts of this character. Analysed using Cognitive Grammar, such 
descriptions can be considered in terms of their effects upon the attentional processing 
of the reader. Use of the present participles ‘murmuring’, ‘snarling and fighting among 
themselves’ (1), ‘prowling’, ‘looking ceaselessly’, ‘crouching’, ‘glittering’, ‘grating’ 
(2), the temporal adverbs ‘once in while’, ‘sometimes’ (1), the quantifier ‘some of them’ 
(2), and nominalisations ‘walkings about’, ‘cries’ (2), all invite the reader to 
conceptualise the vampires’ behaviour through a process of ‘summary scanning’ 
(Langacker, 2008: 111). In Cognitive Grammar, this involves examining multiple 
targets in a cumulative manner, building up to a gestalt conception which is 
apprehended whole, and provides an alternative to ‘sequential scanning’ (the 
prototypical means through which we track events through real-time). By inviting 
readers to apprehend the vampires’ actions in this way, this construal can be said to 
‘atemporalize’ these processes and reduce attention to their component states as part of 
an ‘attenuated’ simulation (Langacker, 2008: 537). In addition, the present participle 
form is said to present a ‘limited scope’ on the process conceptualised, which excludes 
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the source and goal of the action (or agent and patient) from its conceptualisation (2008: 
120). Consequently, instead of conceptualising the vampires’ self-propelled, goal-
directed behaviour directly, we are invited to experience it as Neville does from inside 
the house: as a vague, ongoing, holistic impression in the background of our focused 
attention. Through its focussing of reader attention, I propose, this subjective construal 
suppresses the cues for mind attribution this behaviour presents, and hence limits 
readers’ understanding of the vampires’ actions in terms of thoughts, feelings and 
motivations.  
            Another basic factor in our attributions of mind is our pre-existing categorical 
knowledge and expectations of the entities involved (e.g. Gray et al., 2007). A further 
potential limitation of reader mind attribution in this opening chapter is through a lack 
of ‘specificity’ seen in the vampires’ construal (Langacker, 2008). The vampires are 
first referred to using the pronoun ‘they’, which lacking an antecedent, cues an 
indistinct, undetailed conceptualisation of these characters in the mind of the reader. 
This gradually gains in granularity as the chapter progresses through references to 
‘filthy bastards’ (Matheson, 2001: 11), ‘the women’ (p. 12), ‘men’ (p. 16), before ‘they’ 
are finally resolved as ‘vampires’ in chapter two (p. 21). This is significant as, once 
specified, readers’ attribution of minds for these characters will draw on their schematic 
knowledge of such fictional entities and their associated emotions, or what we might 
term, following Culpeper (2001), their vampire schema. By delaying such naming, 
Matheson can be seen to add an element of uncertainty to readers’ understanding of 
these characters in the opening chapter. Although readers may suspect, through 
inferencing, that the ‘thing’ they are ‘there for’ in extract (1) is to kill Neville, they are 
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given little opportunity to confirm this attributed intention at this point in the novel, nor 
gain any kind of rich understanding of the thoughts and feelings which accompany it.  
           Once activated, this schema is not straightforward in terms of expectations of 
mind. The vampire ‘violates our intuitive expectations of biological agents, and blurs 
the taxonomic line between human and animal’ (Clasen, 2010: 324). Moreover, 
Matheson’s science fictional adaptation of this myth disrupts such culturally-acquired 
knowledge. While Stoker’s Dracula, satirically cast aside within the narrative 
(Matheson, 2001: 23), is cunning and passionate, Matheson’s vampires are more 
ambiguously minded, as Neville’s own attempts at mind attribution suggest:  ‘Why 
didn’t they leave him alone? Did they think they could all have him? Were they so 
stupid they thought that? Why did they keep coming every night?’ (p. 14).  
             In social psychology, mind attribution is motivated by our desire for 
‘effectance’ or a sense of ‘understanding, predictability and control over one’s 
environment’ (Waytz et al., 2010: 412).  In the opening chapter of I Am Legend, 
disruptions of reader mind attribution, I suggest, play a significant role in the 
establishment of an empathetic relationship with Neville, by contributing to a felt lack 
of effectance alongside this character. The unfocused and non-specific construals of 
these figures though the mind of this character, and the uncertainty this evokes, can be 
seen to contribute to the experience of ‘suspense’ which the Goodreads (2014) readers 
describe in relation to this text, and the fear which characterises it as ‘horror’. 
           As the text continues, this lack of certainty as to the nature and richness of the 
mental-states of the vampires is maintained. As Neville learns more about their 
condition, the mental lives of these characters (and their categorisation) comes 
increasingly into question: ‘all the living who came to his house at night were insane, 
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thinking themselves true vampires although actually they were only demented sufferers’ 
(Matheson, 2001: 109). In addition, linguistic choices in their construal continue to 
disrupt mind attribution in readers. Extracts from the narrative in which such limited 
mind attribution has particular significance, analysed in the following section, are those 
in which Neville’s actions towards the vampires are raised for ethical questioning. In 
such scenes, anticipating the novel’s conclusion, Matheson’s strategic manipulation of 
mind attribution has further consequences for readers’ experience of this main character.
  
5.2 Conflicting mind attribution and ethics 
 In extract (3), the description of Neville’s destruction of living vampires reveals his 
doubts regarding the logic and morality of his actions (underlining added for ease of 
reference in my analysis): 
 
(3) 
     There were two of them. In the living room, lying on a couch, was a woman 
about thirty years old, wearing a red housecoat. Her chest rose and fell slowly as 
she lay there, eyes closed, her hands clasped over her stomach.  
     Robert Neville’s hands fumbled on the stake and mallet. It was always hard 
when they were alive; especially with women. He could feel that senseless 
demand returning again, tightening his muscles. He forced it down. It was 
insane, there was no rational argument for it. 
     She made no sound except for a sudden, hoarse intake of breath. As he 
walked into the bedroom, he could hear a sound like the sound of water running. 
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Well, what else can I do? he asked himself, for he still had to convince himself 
he was doing the right thing. 
     He stood in the bedroom doorway, staring at the small bed by the window, 
his throat moving, breath shuddering in his chest. Then, driven on, he walked to 
the side of the bed and looked down at her. 
   Why do they all look like Kathy to me? he thought, drawing out the second 
stake with shaking hands. (Matheson, 2001: 20, underlining added). 
 
Suppression of mental-state cues for the vampires is seen here through the reduced 
attention invited to their role as the object or goal of Neville’s actions. Neville’s killing 
of the woman and child is presented intransitively, through goal-less references to the 
‘instruments’ involved in this material action process: ‘the stake and mallet’, ‘the 
second stake’, and Neville’s ‘hands’, which take the place of Neville himself as a form 
of ‘meronymic agency’ (Simpson, 2004: 76). Similarly, following this passage we learn 
that ‘After lunch, he went from house to house and used up all his stakes. He had forty 
seven stakes’ (Matheson, 2001: 22). Applying Cognitive Grammar, these descriptions 
can be said to restrict readers’ attention to a specific portion of the ‘action chain’ 
conceptualised here, in a restricted ‘profile’ which excludes (or backgrounds) the 
‘agent’, ‘patient’ and very ‘trajectory’ of this self-propelled, goal-directed activity 
(Langacker, 2008: 356). In particular, the vampires are extremely non-prominent 
participants in this scene – the sounds of the woman’s grisly death are presented 
indirectly in the third paragraph through negation and simile: ‘no sound except..’, ‘a 
sound like the sound of water running’, while the young girl must be inferred from 
references to ‘small bed’, ‘her’, and a comparison with Neville’s lost daughter ‘Kathy’ 
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in the final two paragraphs. Through such attentional backgrounding, the mental-states 
which underlie this action – the intentions, sexual desires and perhaps even enjoyment 
of this violence by Neville, and the thoughts and feelings of the vampires as its 
recipients – are less likely to be perceived, and to a lesser degree of richness. 
              This passage reflects another factor affecting mind attribution. In social 
psychology, studies into ‘objectification’ have shown that focused attention upon the 
bodies of individuals (e.g. women in the media) reduces the complexity of the mental-
states attributed to them (Loughnan et al., 2010; Gray et al., 2011). Broadly speaking, 
‘objectification’ might be associated with the effects of meronymic agency, e.g. the 
actions of the vampires’ ‘eyes’ and ‘teeth’ in (2). In (3) the extensive attentional 
focusing on the body of the woman (‘chest’, ‘eyes’, ‘hands’, ‘stomach’ in the first 
paragraph) and Neville (hands’, ‘muscles’, ‘throat’, ‘chest’ throughout) also reflects 
Neville’s ‘senseless’ desire for this woman. Such attentional focussing of body parts, 
and the reduced mind attribution it invites for both Neville and the vampires, is found in 
other morally-problematic scenes within the text, such as those in which Neville is 
experimenting on female vampires (4), or contemplating killing them (5): 
 
(4) 
Her hands closed over his wrists and her body began to twist and flop on the rug. 
Her eyes were still closed, but she gasped and muttered and her body kept trying 
to writhe out of his grip. Her dark nails dug into his flesh (...) Usually he felt a 
twinge of guilt when he realised that, but for some affliction he didn’t 
understand these people were the same as he. But now an experimental fervor 
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had seized him and he could think of nothing else. (Matheson, 2001: 34, 
underlining added) 
(5) 
His eyes ran over the robe, resting a moment on the slight prominence of her 
breasts, dropping then to the bronzed carves and ankles, up to the smooth 
kneecaps. She had a body like a young girl’s. She certainly didn’t look like the 
mother of two. (Matheson, 2001: 126, underlining added) 
          
            Matheson’s manipulation of the minds we construct for these characters can be 
seen to have significant effects for our ethical judgements of such scenes. In their 
psychological study, Gray, Gray and Wegner (2007) found that the attribution of 
mental-states associated with ‘experience’ (such as hunger, fear and pain) correlated 
with participants’ judgements of entities as moral patients – in Aristotle’s sense – who 
might have right or wrong done to them. Meanwhile, attribution of states associated 
with ‘agency’ (such as thought, planning and memory) correlated with judgements of 
them as moral agents, whose actions might be right or wrong. Applying such findings 
to I Am Legend, by reducing reader attributions of mind to Neville as an agent with 
intentions, beliefs and responsibility in (3), (4) and (5), their judgement of his actions as 
a moral agent might also be weakened. In the case of the female vampires, readers’ 
sense of these characters’ ability to experience emotions and pain and thus hold rights 
as moral patients is also likely to be less prominent. Through this construal, I would 
suggest, Matheson is therefore able to alleviate a potentially negative ethical judgement 
of Neville’s actions to some extent in readers.  
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             However, as I have previously stated, readers also draw upon their individual 
knowledge as the basis of mind attributions. In addition, differences in motivation for 
effectance and empathy amongst perceivers also affect mind attribution (Waytz et al., 
2010). In these extracts, details such as ‘thirty years old’, ‘housecoat’, ‘small bed’ (3), 
‘mother of two’ (5), and the observation that ‘but for some affliction he didn’t 
understand these people were the same as he’ (4) can be seen to invite an inferential 
fleshing out of these characters as human beings, and a degree of mind attribution in 
readers, which will vary according to their individual identity, motivations and 
attentional dispositions. The resulting experience for many readers, I would suggest, is a 
sense of the ethical turmoil reflected in Neville’s own thoughts: ‘It was always hard 
when they were alive’, ‘Well what else can I do?’ (3) and the ‘twinge of guilt’ he 
suppresses (4). It is through such manipulations of mind attribution, I would argue, that 
readers are encouraged to empathise with Neville, and the psychological struggle he 
experiences, despite the ethically questionable nature of his actions. Differing in degree 
amongst readers, however, this conflict may contribute to the sense of discomfort 
expressed by readers such as ‘Grace S’ (seen earlier) to this invitation for empathy 
(Goodreads, 2014). Indeed, readers specifying the source of their dislike for Neville in 
his treatment of the female vampires (notably describing these characters as ‘women’ 
and moral patients) lend support to this analysis: 
This sole survivor is a misogynistic man who seems to be dancing on the line of 
justifying rape, in addition to thinking of women as idiots who should be used. 
(‘Nisha Panchal’, Goodreads, 2014) 
the way he objectified the vampire women, that's just really not my thing.. 
(‘machinaheart’, Goodreads, 2014) 
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In general this was not a good book to be a woman in; whether human, vampire 
or somewhere in between. (‘Jennie’, Goodreads, 2014) 
 
5.3 Group minds 
A further aspect of the text’s construal of significance for mind attribution is the 
construal of the vampires as part of a group. For Palmer (2004, 2010, 2011) 
‘intermentality’, or thinking that is ‘joint, group, shared, or collective’ (2010: 41), 
represents a key aspect of ‘social minds’ and a significant ‘set of instructions’ to be 
examined in fiction.  
This aspect of fictional minds can again be supported by drawing on empirical 
research in social psychology, where perception of groups of targets has been shown to 
result in attributions of ‘group mind’, or collective mental-states (Bloom and Veres, 
1999). Furthermore, in recent work, the perceived ‘entitativity’ or cohesiveness of such 
groups, manipulated in terms of gestalt properties such as similarity, proximity and 
common fate, has been found to affect the degree to which a group and its members are 
attributed minds (Morewedge et al., 2013). The relationship between these two kinds of 
mind attribution reflects a ‘trade-off’ whereby ‘the more a group is attributed a group 
mind, the less members of that group are attributed individual minds, and vice versa’ 
(Waytz and Young, 2012: 83). One explanation for this phenomenon is again rooted in 
attention. Groups perceived as a single, cohesive unit or gestalt, it is proposed, are 
processed holistically, with reduced attention to individual members (Morewedge et al., 
2013: 1196). By manipulating the gestalt properties of groups both visually and 
verbally, Waytz and Young (2012) were able to manipulate attributions of mind, and the 
associated ethical judgements of groups as moral agents.  
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In I Am Legend, Palmer’s ‘large intermental unit’ category (2010: 48) must be 
dramatically extended. Here, the entire population of Earth is presented – at least 
initially – as a homogenous group, with the single shared intention of killing Neville. In 
extracts (1) and (2), collective references to the vampires as ‘they’, and the summed 
conceptualisation of their collective movements and mental-states, ‘their snarling and 
fighting among themselves’, ‘they were all here for the same thing’, reflects the wider 
construal of these vampires as a single agentive unit. This is foregrounded in the text by 
a military metaphor: ‘the dark figures stood like silent soldiers on duty’ (Matheson, 
2001: 17), ‘a battalion of bloodsuckers’ (p. 24). Also notable is the tendency to construe 
the vampires that Neville intends to stake, burn or experiment on, as part of such a 
group. At the start of extract (3), the woman and child are conceptualised as a group 
prior to their individuation (‘There were two of them’), and it is the vampire children as 
a collective ‘they’ who ‘always look like Kathy’. Similarly, when carrying out 
experiments on one woman, Neville thinks of her as ‘one of them’:   
 
(6) 
All right, she’s suffering, he argued with himself, but she’s one of them and 
she’d gladly kill you if she got the chance. You’ve got to look at it that way, it’s 
the only way. (Matheson, 2001: 34) 
 
Such a collective construal might be said to induce a ‘group-member mind trade 
off’ in readers (Waytz & Young, 2012), whereby the perception of a ‘group mind’ for 
the vampires reduces our attention to the mental-states of the individuals involved. In 
cognitive-grammatical terms this construal might be understood as involving an 
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increase in the ‘prominence’ of the group relative to its individual participants, as part of 
a basic reversible figure-ground relationship. This linguistic manipulation of mind 
attribution again has consequences for our empathetic and ethical experiences of such 
scenes. By reducing attention to the individual vampire’s suffering in extract (6), this 
collective construal could be said to alleviate readers’ ethical judgements, inviting them 
to empathise with Neville and his terrible circumstances, as opposed to his victim.  
This construal might also be said to contribute to the sense of ‘suspense’ and 
‘fear’ discussed previously. The presentation of targets as an entitative group has been 
shown to increase the application of stereotypical knowledge in the process of mind 
attribution (Dasgupta et al., 1999; Hamilton et al., 2004). In addition to the vampire 
schema, likely to hold negative associations of evil for most readers, this collective 
construal may also evoke our stereotyped perception of groups in general as ‘capable of 
threat, hate and retaliation even in the absence of diagnostic information’ (Dasgupta et 
al., 1999: 1000). In this text, Matheson draws explicitly upon such general tendencies of 
group mind attribution in his development of the military metaphor (2001: 106-109). 
Taking into account the novel’s Cold War context, the extrapolation of ‘ordinary, 
realistic anxieties’ in relation to recognisable groups within society (Clasen, 2010: 314) 
can be seen to give Matheson’s imagined future its horrific impact for readers at the 
time of its production, and today still. 
 
5.4 The twist 
Finally, through its manipulation of mind attribution, the novel sets readers up for its 
final twist. The final chapters of the novel reveal that far from being the mindless 
entities suggested by their focalised construal, the vampires are thinking, feeling beings 
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with complex motivations, fear and beliefs. In the final pages of the novel, we are 
confronted, alongside Neville, with the rich minds of these characters:  
 
(7) 
They all stood looking up at him with their white faces. He stared back. And 
suddenly he thought, I’m the abnormal one now. Normalcy was a majority 
concept, the standard of many and not the standard of just one man. 
     Abruptly that realization joined with what he saw on their faces – awe, fear, 
shrinking horror – and he knew that they were afraid of him. To them he was 
some terrible scourge they had never seen, a scourge even worse than the disease 
they had come to live with. He was an invisible spectre who had left for 
evidence of his existence the bloodless bodies of their loved ones. And he 
understood what they felt and did not hate them. 
(…) 
Full circle. A new terror born in death, a new superstition entering the 
unassailable fortress of forever. 
    I am legend. (Matheson, 2001: 160) 
 
In this conclusion, the attentional construal of the fictional world is dramatically shifted, 
as Matheson reverses its perspective in a radical realignment of figure and ground. 
Having been invited to conceptualise the fictional world up to this point with the 
standard of this ‘one man’ as the prominent subject of our conception, these closing 
paragraphs invite readers to re-conceptualise this world from the perspective of the 
vampires. In this new subjective construal, it is the vampires who are prominent, and it 
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is their lack of mind attribution for Neville, and their resulting uncertainty and fear that 
we are now invited to recognise. Coming ‘full circle’ from the opening chapter, Neville 
is now an attenuated ‘spectre’ and ‘legend’, just like the myth or vampire schema which 
readers have been invited to draw upon during reading. Significantly, it is through an 
appreciation of the rich mental lives of these vampires, enabled for the first time by 
attention to the mental-state cues in their faces, which brings about this empathetic 
understanding in Neville, and which we are invited to share as readers.  
            Having invited readers to empathise with Neville throughout, this ending 
emphasises the ethical importance of empathising with both Neville and the vampires in 
reading the text. Indeed, these two perspectives come together to create the 
defamiliarising statement that forms both the title and closing line: ‘I am legend.’ By 
manipulating readers’ attributions of mind through the linguistic choices made in its 
construal, however, Matheson’s novel invites readers to overlook these other minds to 
some degree during reading, and draw upon their pre-existing expectations and fears in 
relation to group minds. In doing so, the novel raises the variable degree to which we 
attribute minds to others in our everyday lives for critical examination. 
            Finally, this conclusion lends the construal of the vampires identified across the 
extracts examined here, and the limited mind attribution it consistently invites, a further 
interpretative significance. Once attributed to the flawed perspective of Neville, this 
construal, and its resulting pattern of mind attribution, can be identified as part of a 
‘mind style’ for this character, defined by Fowler as the ‘impression of a worldview’ 
created by ‘[c]umulatively consistent structural options, agreeing in cutting the 
presented world to one pattern or another’ (Fowler, 1977: 73). In her development of 
this notion, Semino (2002) applies cognitive theories in order to specify the ‘conceptual 
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structures and cognitive habits’ which make up character worldviews (p.95). In the 
extracts considered here, limited engagement with the minds of the vampires can be 
interpreted as a distinctive cognitive habit for Neville, and one which can be associated 
with both his restricted understanding in the early parts of the novel, and his increasing 
need to alleviate a negative ethical judgement of himself, or guilt, as his understanding 
develops. While critical readers such as those identified at the end of section 5.2 may 
recognise this mind style during a first reading of the text, for a large proportion of 
readers, I would suggest, the attribution of this construal to Neville’s mind style will 
emerge during their second reading, as part of a radically altered experience of this 
character and the vampires he plagues. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this article, I have explored the stylistic manipulation of reader mind attribution for 
the vampires in Richard Matheson’s I Am Legend. Though externally focalised, readers’ 
understanding of these fictional minds, and more specifically, its strategic limitation at 
key points in the narrative, was said to contribute to the establishment of an empathetic 
relationship with its main character-focaliser, and the maintenance of this (sometimes 
uncomfortable) relationship as this character’s actions are raised for ethical questioning. 
Finally, it was suggested that this limited mind attribution, brought about by various 
aspects of the vampires’ construal, may contribute to the presentation of a distinctive 
mind style for Neville, reflecting his engagement with other minds as part of his 
conceptualisation of the fictional world. 
In the course of this analysis I have shown how empirical research on the subject 
of ‘mind attribution’ in social psychology can be applied to our experiences of fictional 
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characters. While the mechanics of this processing, or Theory of Mind, remain a matter 
of debate within the cognitive sciences, I have suggested that beneficial insights for 
literary study might be drawn from empirical research into the factors affecting this 
process, and its consequences.  
This analysis has also explored the use of Cognitive Grammar as a stylistic tool 
for the application of such research to narrative. For Rundquist (2014), Palmer’s 
proposed broadening of the narratological study of fictional minds is a departure from 
the principled linguistic focus of literary stylistics. As I hope to have demonstrated, 
application of the concept of ‘social minds’ does not entail a departure from stylistics 
since, like the categories of thought representation, the cues for their construction during 
reading can be analysed linguistically. Through its fundamental link between language 
and cognition, Cognitive Grammar, I have argued, offers an effective framework for the 
interdisciplinary study of fictional minds. 
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